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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)

MICHAEL RAY EGAN,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case
No. 12707

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from denial of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed
by plaintiff-appellant following a plea

I

l
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,.....I

!

of guilty and sentencing by the trial court.
The plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of
the denial of the petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
FACTS
Prior to trial on the charge of an
unlawful sale of a stimulant drug, appellant,
following consultation with counsel, changed
his previously entered plea from not guilty
to guilty.

Appellant was charged with

selling a stimulant drug, i.e. amphetamine
pills.

There were several other charges

also pending agains.t appellant relating
to the same events which were dropped in
exchange for appellant entering a guilty
plea on this charge (Defendant's Exhibit
1-D, Page 9).

Appellant contends he was

promised not only that the other charges
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would be dropped but that he would receive
probation if a plea of guilty were entered.
During the trial on the writ of habeas
corpus, appellant testified as follows
(App. 35, Lines 6-27):

"Q

Now, Mr. Egan, why did you enter
a plea of Guilty at that time
at that date?

A

Well, the probation, plus the
charges being dropped; I figured
I would be able to get out and
help my wife and go back to my
family.

Q

Was it your understanding that
you would receive probation
through an agreement?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, after the plea was entered
at any time after that, did you
exhibit reluctance to be sentenced
and want to change your plea back
to Not Guilty?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

When was that?

-3-

A

Well, they took me back after
the month was up--and you know,
stayed sentencing for a month,
and hennned and hawed around. I
told Margaret then I would like
to change my plea back to Not
Guilty. She said to shut up or
I would blow the probation.

Q

I see. When was that approximately?

A

In February about the 12th or
somewhere around there.

Q

Was that prior to the time of
sentencing?

A

Yes, it was."

Appellant's counsel during the entering of
the plea and sentencing, Margaret Taylor,
testified that she didn't recall any specifie conversation prior to sentencing about
changing his plea back but that she told him
to "Just hang in there.

Don't give it up.

If you blow up in court now and you get mad
at the judge now it's not going to be good
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-for you."

(App. 44, Lines 24-26).

However,

she did testify that such a conversation
could have taken place.
ARGUMENT
I . APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
AND IMPARTIAL ASSISTANCE OF COURT-APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS UNDER THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Appellant contends that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel during
the time of sentencing and pre-sentencing.
Counsel during these proceedings was Margaret
Taylor appointed by the court from the Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association.

Following

the filing of the writ of habeas corpus, the
court appointed F. John Hill, also of the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

Al-

though one of appellant's principal grounds
for issuance of the writ was incompetency
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of counsel, Mr. Hill's presentation to the
court totally lacked any evidence as to the
ability of counsel even though Margaret
Taylor testified as a witness.

Specifi-

cally, Mr. Hill failed to inquire into
counsel's failure to bring to the court's
attention appellant's desire to change his
Although there is a

plea to not

dispute as to whether or not this request
came before or after sentencing, there is
no dispute that he did make the request
during the sentencing procedure.

Even

assuming that the request did not come
until after imposition of the sentence,
it was counsel's duty to present that request to the court.
It is clear under Utah law that a
withdrawal of guilty plea may be considered
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by the court even after sentence is imposed.
see, for example, State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah
68, 7 P.2d 825 (1938) where the court considered, but denied, a petition to withdraw
a plea of guilty after petitioner had served
three years under a void sentence.

See also

State v. Fedden, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d
753 (1953); 21 Arn. Jur. 2d 506.
Secondly, Mr. Hill did not call as a
witness appellant's wife concerning her
conversation with Margaret Taylor with
regard to appellant's desire to change his
plea (See App. SO, Lines 19-22).
It has been consistently held in line
with the spirit of the constitution that
it is not only the duty of the court to
appoint counsel of sufficient ability and
experience to present the accused's
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defense, but the court should also appoint
counsel who has no conflicting interest
which would interfere with a fair presentation of the defense.

See, for example,

the numerous cases holding that a person
is deprived of his constitutional rights
where the court requires a defendant,
over his objection, to accept the services
of an attorney who has also been appointed
for a co-defendant, where the defenses of
such co-defendant are inconsistent.

Glasser

v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 620,
62 S. Ct. 947 (1942).

In Glasser, the

court also stated that where such a conflict exists, to determine the precise degree
of prejudice is at once difficult and
unnecessary since the right to assistance
of effective counsel was too fundamental
and absolute to allow courts to indulge
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l

in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial.

See

also California v. Lonigan, 22 Cal. 2d
569, 140 P.2d 24 (1943).
In Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19,
465 P.2d 343 (1970) the Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed the right to effective counsel
for the defense of the criminally accused
as provided in the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

see

also Parks v. State, 457 P.2d 818 (Okl. Cr.
1969); Lopez v. Turner, 24 U.2d 23, 465
P.2d 345 (1970).
The recent case of Johnson v. Turner,
24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 90 (1970), also
involved an appeal from the denial of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus where
the court stated at P. 441:
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"We are firmly committed to
the right of an accused to have
competent counsel to assist in
safeguarding his rights at all
essential stages of a proceeding
against him."
Under these circumstances where the
second court-appointed counsel was from
the same legal defenders office and was
charged with inquiring into the sensitive
issues of incompetent counsel and promises
of probation, where such testimony might
embarrass the first counsel, and, in fact,
failed to make a proper inquiry, appellant
has been clearly denied his constitutional
rights under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

II. A PROMISE OF PROBATION IN EXCHANGE FOR A PLEA OF GUILTY IS A DENIAL
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFFORDED TO
APPELLANT UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
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The issue of whether or not appellant

was promised probation in exchange for his
guilty plea is recognized by appellant to
be primarily a fact question on which the
trial court entered a finding.

However,

this court should carefully review the
plea bargaining arrangement involved in
this matter.

Appellant testified to the

trial court that had it not been for the
promise of probation, he would not have
entered a plea of guilty to the charge
(App. 36, Lines 19-21).

Even though

appellant stated to the court during his
sentencing that no promises of probation
had been made, such a response was the
only one available to appellant after his
attorney had advised him to "Shut up, or
you' 11 blow the whole dea 1."
Lines 22-23).
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(App. 35,

It is clear that when the accused
believes he must act in a certain way in
order for the "deal" to be effective and
based upon such belief acts accordingly
based upon the promise of probation and
dropping the related cases, the writ
should issue.

See generally 24 CJS 1606

(15) Criminal Law.
CONCLUSION
A reading of the entire record indi-

cates a desire of appellant to enter a
not guilty plea and a reliance on the
promises of counsel that he would receive
probation and have the other charges dismissed if he went along with the court.
Appellant did not receive a fair hearing
during the habeas corpus proceedings
since court-appointed counsel was presented
with a clear conflict when asked to inquire
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into the legal capabilities of a person
from the same law office and, in fact,
did not inquire into this important
matter.
The denial of the petition for writ
of habeas corpus should be reversed and
the writ ordered granted.
Respectfully submitted,

David L. Gillette
Attorney for Appellant
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy
of the foregoing to Honorable Vernon B.
Romney, Attorney General, David S. Young,
Assistant Attorney General, State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, and to
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Michael Ray Egan, P. O. Box 250, Draper,
Utah, this 29th day of February, 1972.
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